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Abstract
Practical applications of coordination models de-
mand appropriate security guarantees. In ad hoc set-
tings this must be achieved without reliance on any cen-
tral point of control. Lime is one of the few coordina-
tion models and middleware to provide support for ad
hoc networking and mobility. This paper shows how
security can be added to Lime by simple extensions to
the original model. The extensions include password
protected tuple spaces, per tuple access controls and
encrypted communication between parts of application
running on different hosts. Furthermore, these new ca-
pabilities are accommodated with minimum changes to
the original design.
1 Introduction
As distributed applications continue to grow, so do
their needs for quality of service. Deadlines, availabil-
ity and security are only some of the quality of ser-
vice attributes expected from the various components
of a distributed application. Since distributed appli-
cations inherently require communication between re-
mote components, the security of interactions is a basic
requirement. Given that various parts of a distributed
application can be developed by different programmers,
executed for different users, and can travel through the
networks, accessing resources and interacting with each
other, security mechanisms are needed in order to con-
trol and limit, when necessary, accessibility to resources
and information.
In wired networks security issues are often resolved
by appealing to specialized services on a central ma-
chine. Ad hoc networks cannot employ such solutions.
In ad hoc settings the computational environment con-
sists of a group of devices that communicate only when
in proximity to each other. No central database is avail-
able to store names, passwords, access rights and so
forth. Furthermore, frequent disconnections present us
with additional challenges since communication cannot
be guaranteed for a long period of time. Protection
techniques must be adjusted to take into account these
factors.
While the original Linda[6] model has numerous im-
plementations and extensions, few of them address ad
hoc networking. One such implementation is Lime [11],
which offers strong support for coordination in ad hoc
networks. The computational unit is called an agent.
The model allows for multiple tuple spaces per agent,
identified by names. Agents on different hosts within
communication range can share tuple spaces with the
same name. When connected, transient tuple space
sharing implemented by Lime makes the content of tu-
ple spaces with the same name available to all others
as if local to each agent. In the initial release of Lime,
agents on different hosts coordinate their activities via
public tuple spaces. The information being communi-
cated is available to any agent interested in a particular
tuple space.
Security enforcement is needed to protect the easily
accessible tuple space information content from tam-
pering or unauthorized usage. In general, security can
be achieved by implementing authentication, cryptogra-
phy, and access control into the underlying middleware
supporting the application.
Cryptography is a mechanism used to protect stored
and exchanged information from potential unautho-
rized readers. The information is made illegible by
encryption so that, even if available to everyone, it is
meaningless for all those who cannot decrypt it. En-
cryption and decryption involve the use of keys or pass-
words. The distribution of keys and passwords in ad
hoc systems is a very complicated issue and for sim-
plicity reasons remains outside the scope of this paper.
Access control checks if a certain type of interaction
is permitted between the entities involved (i.e., if the
entities are allowed to perform the action they intend
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to). For example, in the UNIX file system, different
files on the hard disk can have different access policies
for different users. Users are separated in different cat-
egories and each category has specific access rights to
each file (e.g., read only, read-write, and so forth). This
helps prevent unauthorized information access (like the
UNIX case) or protects the encrypted information from
being destroyed by an attacker that cannot decrypt it.
In an ad hoc setting, an application interacts with other
applications controlled by users whose identities cannot
be readily verified. A distributed implementation that
relies only on local information for user identification
is preferable.
Authentication is the mechanism used to verify that
an entity is indeed who it claims to be when trying to
access resources or information. Since this involves a
third (neutral and trusted) computing base (authen-
tication server, database, etc.), in our approach if an
agent meets the criteria imposed by the first two mech-
anisms, we consider it entitled to access the informa-
tion.
In distributed systems various applications may
need different security constraints. Cryptography and
access control can be used separately or in combina-
tion where necessary. They have been added to the
Lime coordination model in order to secure the inter-
action between entities, particularly the contents of tu-
ple spaces. To achieve this we designed and developed
password protected tuple spaces, secure communica-
tion between hosts, and tuple level access policies.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 reviews the Lime coordination model. Sec-
tion 3 presents extensions to the original model for se-
cure coordination. Section 4 contains implementation
issues. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of our
work. Related work on secure coordination is presented
in Section 6. We draw conclusions in Section 7.
2 The Lime Coordination Model
The Lime (version 2.0) middleware supports the de-
velopment of applications exhibiting physical mobility
of hosts, logical mobility of agents, or both. An agent
is any piece of software that accesses tuple spaces and
performs computational tasks. Hosts are containers for
these agents. Hosts can move in physical space, while
agents can move from host to host. Lime implements
a coordination model inspired by the original Linda
model. The context for computation, represented in
Linda by a globally accessible, persistent tuple space,
is represented in Lime by transient sharing of tuple
spaces associated with each individual mobile agents.
Lime also extends Linda tuple spaces with a notion of
location and with the ability to react to a given state.
Transparent Context Maintenance. The model
underlying Lime accomplishes the shift from a fixed
context to a dynamically changing one by distribut-
ing the global Linda tuple space across multiple tuple
spaces, each local to a mobile agent, and by introduc-
ing rules for transient sharing of the individual tuple
spaces based on naming and connectivity; Lime also al-
lows for multiple tuple spaces local to an agent. These
tuple spaces are differentiated by name and are shared
with other agents that share local tuple spaces with the
same name, forming a federated (global) tuple space.
From a mobile agent’s point of view, the only way to
access a global tuple space is through an interface tu-
ple space (its), permanently and exclusively attached
to the agent itself. The its contains tuples the mobile
agent is willing to share with other agents. This rep-
resents the only context accessible to the agent when
it is alone. This tuple space is transiently shared with
similarly named itss belonging to mobile agents that
are connected. Hence, the content perceived through
the its changes dynamically in response to changes in
the set of mobile agents sharing a tuple space. Access
to the its takes place using the Linda primitives (e.g.,
in, rd, out), whose semantics are basically unaffected.
Also, Lime offers non-blocking versions of in and rd in
the form of probe variants of the same operations (e.g.,
inp, rdp). Lime also includes several extensions of the
traditional Linda model designed to handle groups of
tuples (e.g., ing, rdg and outg) as well as their non-
blocking variants (e.g., ingp and rdgp, where applica-
ble). While the basic operations return a matching
tuple (if available) or null otherwise (if nonblocking),
the group operations return all matching tuples (or null
if none available and the call is non-blocking).
Another extension to the traditional Linda model is
a new pattern matching mechanism. Each field in a
tuple has a name, a type and a value. Since each field
is identified by name, the tuples are no longer an or-
dered structure but a set of named values. Templates
use field names to refer to the content of a tuple. The
values of the named fields can be filtered using predi-
cates in templates. A match will be declared between
a tuple and a template if the tuple contains fields to
satisfy each predicate in the template (i.e., the tuple
has a field for each field of the template with the same
name, the type of this field is the same or a subtype
of the field in the template, and the value of the field
satisfies the constraint specified in the template field).
Templates need to specify only a subset of the fields for
a matching operation to succeed (e.g., a template that
specifies 3 fields can match a tuple with 6 fields if 3
of the tuple’s fields satisfy the requirements expressed
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Figure 1. Transiently shared tuple spaces encompass
physical and logical mobility.
in the template). Lime allows for polymorphic tuple
matching, i.e., a field in the template provided for pat-
tern matching will match the respective field of a tuple
if the latter contains an object of the same type or of a
subtype of the one specified in the template. This al-
lows for wild cards in pattern matching (e.g., the Java
Object class in a template field will match any field in
a tuple) and for the use of interfaces to retrieve objects
that implement them.
Encompassing Physical and Logical Mobility.
In an ad hoc network, Lime mobile hosts are connected
when the distance between them allows communication
to take place. In Lime, activities associated with ar-
rival or departure of a host are called engagement and
disengagement, respectively. Mobile agents are con-
nected when they are co-located (i.e., reside on the
same host), or they reside on hosts that are connected.
Creation and termination of mobile agents is a spe-
cial case of connection and disconnection, respectively.
Figure 1 depicts the Lime model. Mobile agents are
the only active components; mobile hosts are roaming
containers providing connectivity and execution sup-
port for agents. In other words, mobile agents are the
only components that carry “concrete” tuple spaces
with them. Multiple agents’ tuple spaces that are tran-
siently shared across hosts form a federated tuple space.
Controlling Context Awareness. Lime fosters
a style of coordination that reduces the details of dis-
tribution and mobility to changes in what is perceived
to be a local tuple space. This view is powerful as it
relieves the designer from specifically addressing the
changes in configuration, but some mobile applications
need to explicitly address the distributed nature of the
data for performance or optimization reasons. Lime
provides such fine-grained control over the context per-
ceived by the mobile unit by extending Linda opera-
tions with tuple location parameters that define pro-
jections of the transiently shared tuple space. Lime
expresses tuple location parameters in terms of agent
identifiers and host identifiers. These identifiers can be
used both to place tuples at a particular agent location
or to restrict queries to specific agents or hosts.
The read-only LimeSystemTupleSpace tuple space
provides awareness of the system configuration. Its
tuples contain information about the mobile agents
present in the community, physical hosts they ex-
ecute on, and tuple spaces created for coordina-
tion. Standard tuple space operations on the
LimeSystemTupleSpace tuple space allow an agent to
respond to the arrival and departure of other agents
and hosts.
Reacting to Changes in Context. Mobility en-
tails a highly dynamic environment, where reacting to
changes constitutes a major fraction of the application
design. Therefore, Lime extends the basic Linda tuple
space with the notion of reaction. A reaction R(s, p) is
defined by a code fragment s that specifies the actions
to be executed when a tuple matching the pattern p
is found in the tuple space. After each operation on
the tuple space, Lime non-deterministically selects a
reaction and compares the pattern p against the tu-
ple space contents. If a matching tuple is found, s is
executed, otherwise the reaction is a skip. This selec-
tion and execution proceeds until there are no reactions
enabled, and normal processing resumes. Thus, reac-
tions are executed as if they belonged to a separate
reactive program which runs to fixed point after each
non-reactive statement. Blocking operations are not
allowed in s, as they could prevent the program from
reaching fixed point.
Reactions in Lime come in two forms: strong re-
actions and weak reactions. Strong reactions execute
atomically with the writing of the tuple that enables
them. These reactions are not allowed over the entire
federated tuple space; they must always be restricted
to a host or agent. Otherwise, maintaining the re-
quirements of atomicity and serialization imposed by
strong reactive statements would require a distributed
transaction encompassing multiple hosts for every tu-
ple space operation. Location parameters have to be
used to define the projection of the tuple space on
which the reaction will be installed and executed. Lime
also provides the notion of weak reaction. Processing
of a weak reaction proceeds as in the case of strong
reactions, except that the execution of s does not hap-
pen atomically with the detection of a tuple matching
p; instead, it is guaranteed to take place eventually if
connectivity is preserved. This eliminates the need for
a distributed transaction and allows this type of reac-
tion to be installed and to execute over the entire tuple
space.
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Maintaining Group Membership in Highly
Dynamic Contexts. Environments characterized by
frequent disconnections can seriously affect system per-
formance and maintenance. For this reason, the initial
version of Lime made the simplifying assumption of
announced disconnection. This allowed operations to
complete and communication to stop before the actual
disconnection occurs. The current version of Lime pro-
tects applications from the complexity associated with
sudden disconnection by using location information in
the engagement/disengagement protocol.
The concept of safe distance [5] was introduced to
help predict disconnections. Two hosts are considered
to be at a safe distance if given the speed of the two
hosts, any task in progress is guaranteed to complete
before any disconnection can occur. The safe distance
is usually a fraction of the range of the wireless trans-
mitter. Once the safe distance is exceeded, an au-
tomatic disengagement protocol is triggered and the
group is split. The safe distance ensures that no mes-
sages between group members are lost and that mes-
sages are sent and received in the same configuration.
This helps prevent inconsistent states when the actual
disconnection occurs. When a host approaches a group,
it is allowed to engage the group only after it comes
within safe distance of some member of the group. This
ensures a clean and consistent group membership man-
agement, in case the host decides to move away from
the group soon after engagement. (Since ad hoc rout-
ing is not included in the current software release, the
groups are clusters of fully connected hosts. However,
the use of ad hoc routing would not affect the Lime
software in any way, only the data transport protocol.
Work on including ad hoc routing in a future release is
in progress.)
Software Distribution. Lime is available un-
der a GNU’s LGPL open source license. Source code
and development notes may be obtained from lime.
sourceforge.net.
In the following sections, we show how the design of
specialized coordination middleware takes advantage of
the rich set of features offered by Lime.
3 Security Extensions
3.1 Password Protected Tuple Spaces
Why it is needed. Although Lime implements the
Linda coordination model, it has some notable exten-
sions. One important extension is the possibility to use
multiple tuple spaces identified by different names, as
opposed to the single, globally available, tuple space
in Linda. Lime uses LimeSystemTupleSpace for inter-
nal management purposes. This tuple space contains
tuples that represent agents, hosts and tuple spaces.
However, the information in this tuple space is read-
only available to an agent that wishes to look into it.
By looking into this tuple space an agent can obtain
the names of all tuple spaces created and shared by
all other agents in the group. By simply knowing the
name of a tuple space, any agent can create a local tu-
ple space with the same name, share it with everybody
else who has such a local tuple space shared and have
access to all the information in the entire federated
tuple space. The polymorphic pattern matching that
Lime supports makes it even easier to tamper with the
tuple space content.
How we provide it. The first extension towards
secure coordination protects tuple spaces from unau-
thorized access. We consider an agent to be autho-
rized to access the tuple space information if it has
the name of the tuple space and the password that
protects it. This makes the name of the tuple space
the key to all the information in that tuple space. To
protect the information means to protect the name of
the tuple space. The LimeSystemTupleSpace, among
other information, contains tuples that identify every
tuple space (by name). Since the name is available
in LimeSystemTupleSpace, the first step is to make
the information obtained from LimeSystemTupleSpace
unusable in its raw form. Changes are required to en-
sure that extracting the name of a tuple space from the
LimeSystemTupleSpace will no longer provide enough
information for an agent to create a tuple space with
the same name and share it with other agents gain-
ing access to information this way. To achieve this,
some processing of the tuple space name will be done
on the way from the constructor call, when creat-
ing the tuple space, to the internal storage of the
name inside the system. The information available in
LimeSystemTupleSpace will be the processed name of
the tuple space. We make sure this information cannot
be used in its form from LimeSystemTupleSpace and
also that it cannot be generated incorrectly. For this
reason tuple spaces are split in two categories: tuple
spaces that we want to protect and tuple spaces that
are freely accessible (i.e., unprotected). If the user cre-
ates a tuple spaces that is intended to be secure, the
user will have to provide a password. If no password is
provided the tuple space is assumed to be public (i.e.,
unprotected). For secure tuple spaces, the password is
used to encrypt the name before marking it as a secure
tuple space name and forwarding it to the previous im-
plementation of Lime which will use it as if it were a
regular string representing a name of a tuple space that
will be used for sharing.
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3.2 Tuple Level Access Control
Why it is needed. Currently, once a tuple space is
shared, all tuples in that tuple space are available to
all agents sharing a tuple space with the same name
(these agents can be co-located or can run on different
hosts within communication range). Any such agent
can read and remove any tuple from the federated tu-
ple space, no matter where that tuple is located, as
long as the local tuple space that contains the tuple is
shared. As we have seen in the previous section, we can
protect tuple spaces by using passwords. This means
that if an agent wants to remove a tuple, it must have
already had access to that tuple space (using the right
public name and password or just the name if the tuple
space is not protected). Therefore, an attack that tar-
gets the removal of a tuple to provoke a denial of service
from the agent that published that tuple is less likely
to take place. However, the polymorphic tuple match-
ing mechanism leaves plenty of room for programming
mistakes if not used correctly. An agent executing an in
with a template that contains two Object formals will
remove any tuples with two fields from the federated
tuple space, even though some of them may not be re-
ally needed by the agent that called the in. Since that
agent is not likely to write those tuples back and even
less likely to write them back to the local tuple spaces of
the agents from where they were retrieved, they can be
lost for the community of agents. Should this scenario
happen, the original owner of the tuple(s) will not be
notified and will not know that the tuple is no longer
there. If that tuple represents a service that the agent
wants to advertise or some other important informa-
tion about the owner agent, its (accidental) removal
may have negative impact on the interaction among
agents and the application progress.
How we provide it. To prevent these accidents from
happening, we designed and implemented an access
mechanism based on access rights. The approach is
somewhat similar to the file access policy in UNIX like
operating systems. The community of agents is split in
two: the owner and the others. We refer to the agent
that writes the tuple in its own local (and shared) tu-
ple space as the owner. This agent owns the tuples in
its local tuple space. For the tuples in this local tuple
space, all other agents are considered to be part of the
“others” group.
The tuple space access represents writing, reading or
removal of one or more tuples. Operations that handle
groups of tuples and reactions reduce eventually to the
three operations listed above. Given a federated tuple
space writing a tuple to a contributing tuple space is
always permitted and so is reading a tuple. If an agent
needs to write tuples to a tuple space and does not
want any other agent to read it, the agent can use a
private tuple space for its own computation, not shared
with anyone else. Since this is possible in Lime, no
changes are needed. Only the removal of tuples needs
to be controlled. We desire to allow the owner of a
tuple to remove it while other agents may be restricted
from removing it. This can be accomplished by mark-
ing the tuple read-only. Figure 2 shows the execution
of an in and inp on the tuple space local to the issuer
of the operation and on other tuple spaces shared by
other agents and having the same name. In Figure 3
the execution of an ing operation is similarly depicted.
Locally, all tuples are returned (assuming that they all
match the template, regardless of access control pol-
icy). For an operation initiated by an agent different
from the owner of the tuples, the result is filtered and
only the non read-only tuples are returned.
tuple
template
in/inp
template
Local tuple space
Agent2
blocked/filtered result
result
ok
in/inp
RO
Agent1
Local tuple space
Figure 2. The execution of an in or inp on a read-
only tuple local to the issuer of the call of in another
agent’s tuple space.
owner agent
tuple
tuple
tuple RO
tuple RO
other agent
ing
filtered results
all resultsing
Figure 3. The execution of an ing on a group of
read-only and fully accessible tuples.
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In Lime, tuples are augmented with location infor-
mation. When a tuple is written to a tuple space, it has
a current location, and a destination location (which is
used to migrate tuples to different agents or hosts).
The current location contains information which iden-
tifies the agent in whose local tuple space the tuple
currently resides. This agent is also the owner of the
tuple. Upon migration, which takes place upon en-
gagement or when the tuple is created, the location
information changes and so do the access rights. The
new owner of the tuple obtains full access to this tuple
while the former owner becomes one of the “others”.
If the new agent wants to change the access policy for
this particular tuple, it can remove it and reinsert it
with the new access policy.
Since the location information changes upon migra-
tion, we added information about the creator of a tuple
in the class that implements the tuple. The creator in-
formation is very important for templates. This will
identify the agent that called the in operation (or any
of its variations). The tuples marked read-only will not
be returned as results for calls originating from other
agents than the owner. This means that an in will re-
main blocked if the only matching tuples are read only,
an inp will return null if no other tuple is found and
an ing will filter out the read-only tuples if their scope
is a tuple space owner by an agent different from the
agent that issued the calls.
3.3 Secure Remote Access
Why it is needed. In Lime, tuple spaces with the
same name are shared forming a federated tuple space
that can span multiple hosts. Consequently, an opera-
tion can involve local and/or remote (federated) tuple
space access. If the call involves remote execution, the
parameters will be sent across the network and the re-
sults will be sent back over insecure lines.
How we provide it. To protect the communication
we encrypted the parameters and the results with the
password used when the tuple space was created (if
any). The remote party is supposed to have the pass-
word since it shares a tuple space with the same (en-
crypted) name and it received the call. If the password
is correct, the remote party will be able to decrypt
the parameters and the command will be executed cor-
rectly. The involved parties can decide on a password
over a secure channel (over the phone or, as seen in
section 5, using public key encryption and read only
tuples). Backward compatibility is preserved by al-
lowing the use of unprotected tuple spaces. However,
secure tuple spaces are protected from calls originat-
ing on hosts that use older (insecure) versions of Lime.
Older APIs will send the requests unencrypted and and
will not be served if the tuple spaces they refer to are
password protected (an exception will be thrown in this
case). The return of results from the tuple space will be
handled in the same manner. Figure 4 shows how inter-
ceptors secure the communication between two hosts.
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Figure 4. Interceptors catch messages and encrypt
them before sending and then decrypt them upon re-
ceipt.
4 Implementation
4.1 Password Protected Tuple Spaces Implemen›
tation
The interface the programmer uses to create secure
tuple spaces is very similar to the interface offered by
the previous version of Lime. The difference is that
tuple spaces (secure or not) are created using the Se-
cureLimeTupleSpace class. While the constructors still
exist in their previous form, a new one was created,
with an extra parameter: the password (Figure 5). If
no password is provided, a simple, unprotected tuple
space will be created, like in the previous version of
Lime. An important moment in the life of a tuple
space is its creation. This is the only moment when
the agent explicitly uses the password. Once the agent
has the handle to the tuple space, it does not need the
password anymore. The tuple space handle will enable
the agent to access the tuple space for as long as the
agent has it without having to provide the password.
All operations will be called as before and will use the
password transparently to the agent if needed (see Se-
cure Remote Access Implementation Section). A tuple
space operation can only be called by a Lime agent.
Moreover, another important observation here is that
the handle of a tuple space can only be used by the
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agent that created it. When an operation is called on
a tuple space, Lime verifies that it was called by the
thread representing the agent that created it. Even if
the handle of a tuple space is obtained correctly by an
agent, it cannot be transferred and used by another
agent. This is why it is not necessary to ask for the
password when a tuple space operation is called.
The name of the secure tuple space is obtained from
the provided name and password. This encrypted name
appears in the LimeSystemTupleSpace. The tuple
space name (encrypted name when a password is pro-
vided or the plain clear name if the tuple space is not
meant to be protected) will be prefixed by a differentia-
tor: letter ”U” for unencrypted or ”S” for secure tuple
space. The tuple space ”blue” is different form the
tuple space ”blue” + ”pwd”, where ”pwd” is a pass-
word used to protect the second tuple space. They can
coexist but no sharing takes place. The prefixes en-
sure that a tuple space cannot be created incorrectly.
Since they are internally added, they cannot be manip-
ulated by agents. Reading the name of a (secure) tuple
space from LimeSystemTupleSpace will not be enough
to create an insecure tuple space with the same name.
The prefixes also address the case when the result of
encrypting the clear name of a tuple space coincides
with the name of an unencrypted tuple space (before
adding prefixes).
Internally, the Lime server has a SecurityTable
that stores entries of the form [encrypted name, pass-
word]. An entry is added to this table every time a
new secure tuple space is created. When an opera-
tion is executed on the tuple space, if it runs on the
local host of the issuer (identifiable by location param-
eters that define the projection of the tuple space) no
further verification is needed. For executions of tuple
space operations that span beyond the limits of issuer’s
host, the table will be used for more verifications. See
Section 4.3 for details.
4.2 Tuple Level Protection Implementation
Even though tuple space access can now be pro-
tected by passwords, in some cases even finer grain
control may be needed. To implement read-only tuples,
several changes were needed to the previous version of
Lime and to Lights, the tuple space implementation
that Lime uses. First, the class Tuple was enhanced
with a new constructor (Figure 6). This constructor
specifies what access policy should be applied for this
tuple, specifically if the tuple will be marked read-only
or not. To enforce the access policy, the Tuple class
was also enhanced with a new member called ”owner”.
This is of type AgentLocation and identifies the agent
that creates a tuple or a template. This information
cannot be handled by the programmer and is filled in
by the Lime system when a tuple is created and writ-
ten to the tuple space. When any of the in, inp or ing is
called, the creator information of the template (which
always identifies the agent that issued the operation) is
verified against the current location information of the
tuple being checked for matching. If the call originates
from an agent different from the owner of the tuple,
and if the tuple is masked as read-only, then the tuple
will not be declared a match for the template. The
tuple can, however, be read using any of the rd, rdp or
rdg operations and a matching template.
By enforcing different matching policies, different
levels of tuple accessibility can be achieved. A tuple
can be password protected if it contains a field that
stores a password and if the matching policy requires
that the template provides the exact password. To do
so, the polymorphic matching has to be disabled for the
field that stores the password and exact value match
has to be enforced. Differently from the read-only tu-
ples, this mechanism can allow or block the reading of
tuples as well as their removal.
Implementation wise, a tuple is an ordered array of
fields (which have a type and a value). The various
field matching policies demanded changes in the Field
class. The class was enhanced with a new member that
specifies what kind of matching applies for each partic-
ular field. When fields are added to a tuple, the type
of matching can be specified for each of them. Figure 7
shows how fields are added to tuples and how to specify
the matching policy for each of them. Constants.EV,
Constants.ET and Constants.PT are predefined integer
constants that identify the Exact Value, Exact Type,
and Polymorphic Type matching policies.
For Exact Value matching both the type and the
value have to match exactly. Exact Type policy al-
lows for formals in the patters. The type, however,
has to be exactly the type of the respective field in the
tuple. Polymorphic Type is the most flexible policy.
This allows for wild cards in field matching (formals of
type Object). Figure 8 shows what different templates
match the tuple 〈Integer(5)〉, depending on the type
of matching requested when the tuple was created.
There is an important difference between the im-
plementation of read-only tuple access and the field
matching policies. The field matching policies apply
the same for both the owner of a tuple as well as for
any other agent,i.e., it does not matter what type of
call triggered the matching mechanism. For read-only
tuples, both the type of operation and the location in-
formation influence the matching policy (results of read
operations will not be verified while results of opera-
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SecureLimeTupleSpace(java.lang.String name, java.lang.String password)
— creates a new secure tuple space using the public tuple space name and the password.
This call places an entry in the SecurityTable mapping the mangled name to the password.
Figure 5. The Call that Creates a Secure Tuple Space
Tuple(int accessControl)
— creates a new tuple with the specified access policy. The acessControl parameter defines the
visibility of the tuple for agents other than the one that owns it with respect to removal.
Figure 6. The Call that Creates a Tuple with a Specied Access Policy
Tuple t = new Tuple();
t.addActual(new Integer(1975), Constants.EV).addActual(new String(”WashU”));
— adds fields to a tuple.
To match this tuple, a template will need to have an Exact Value on its first field (that is an
actual of type Integer and value 5). Since the second field doesn’t have any matching policy
specified, the Polymorphic Type is assumed. That is any formal of type String (or a supertype)
would match the tuple.
Figure 7. Adding Fields and Matching Policy to a Tuple
Exact value Exact type Poly type
〈Integer(5)〉 yes yes yes
〈Integer〉 no yes yes
〈Object〉 no no yes
Figure 8. Various answers of the matching
mechanism to different tuples under different
matching policies
tions that involve the removal of tuple(s) may need to
be filtered.
4.3 Communication Level Protection Implemen›
tation
Remote operations are executed on some projection
of the federated tuple space defined by location param-
eters, which include hosts different than the one on
which the requesting agent runs. The messages that
carry operation requests are of two types: messages
that carry reactions and messages that carry regular
tuple space operations. When an agent executes a call
that spans beyond the limits of the current host, an
interceptor catches it, analyzes the tuple space that
the message refers to and takes the appropriate ac-
tion (the use of the interceptor pattern [17] is natural
for this case, when we add security to a system that
in its initial design did not address this issue). The
interceptor verifies if the name of the tuple space is
present in the SecurityTable. If the message refers
to an unprotected tuple space (it is not in the table),
the interceptor lets it to pass through unchanged. If
the tuple space is a secure one, the interceptor will ex-
tract from the table the password that corresponds to
that tuple space and will use it to encrypt the message.
The interceptor creates a packet that contains the en-
crypted message and the encrypted name of the tuple
space the message refers to and forwards this packet to
the other involved hosts. On the recipient’s side, ac-
tions happen symmetrically. Another interceptor will
catch the incoming the message will lookup the name
of the tuple space in the local SecurityTable and if
found, will use the corresponding password to decrypt
the message. The message is then forwarded to the
LimeServer. If the target tuple space is not a secure
one, the name will not be found in the SecurityTable
and will be forwarded unchanged to the LimeServer.
The return of results is handled the same way.
5 Discussion
There is an essential conflict between the flexibil-
ity and ease of access to information and the expres-
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sive power of an access control model. By designing
and implementing this extension to the original Lime
model, we sought to achieve a balance between the two
and to offer the programmer the possibility to choose
the level of access control. The locking and matching
mechanisms we provide make possible many construc-
tions useful in building a safe distributed application.
For example, with the mechanisms we provide the
use of public keys has become possible. When using
public keys, a major security concern is to be able to
tie the key to its real owner. Using the facilities offered
by our implementation, the man-in-the-middle attack
can be avoided. If an agent publishes its public key in a
read-only tuple in its local tuple space, any agent that
wants to use this public key to send a secret message
to the first agent can easily verify that the agent is in-
deed the creator of the tuple or not. An attacker might
write a tuple and have it migrate to the first agent’s
local tuple space (specifying the destination location of
the tuple) but it will not be able to alter the informa-
tion about the creator of this tuple. The second agent
will be able to detect that the creator of the tuple is not
the owner of that tuple and thus realize that this tuple
is a trap. Once the advertising of public keys is secure,
agents can exchange private keys to create safe commu-
nication channels. Even though they can communicate
via password protected tuple spaces, this mechanism
allows for session keys or changing the password used
to create the secure tuple space the next time.
Another important aspect of this work is the possi-
bility to protect applications against denial of service
attacks. An application may offer services over the net-
work to interested parties. To do so, it can advertise
the service in a tuple written in the local tuple space.
The tuple contains an object that represents a proxy of
the service along with a profile that describes the ser-
vice. Interested agents search the network for services
that advertise a profile that matches their needs. This
mechanism was introduced in Jini [4], [18], [12] and was
adapted to ad hoc networks in [9]. In such a scenario, a
malicious agent may consistently remove the advertise-
ment for the service and the advertiser wouldn’t even
notice. Read-only tuples make this attack impossible.
The various field matching policies can also be used
in service provision scenarios to ensure specific types
of access to a proxy object. For example a server may
deny service to all clients that do not ask specifically
for its help (e.g., only ”laser printer” may be too vague
for a certain server which expects a more precise de-
scription like ”color laser printer with 600 dpi”).
The secure remote access protects the communica-
tion between hosts. The quality of protection depends
on the algorithm used. In our implementation and ex-
periments we used triple DES.
Read-only tuple spaces are currently under investi-
gation. This adds another level of security by allowing
an agent to protect itself against being flooded with tu-
ples from a malicious agent. Furthermore, once read-
only tuple spaces become available, more scenarios can
be developed under the new circumstances. The guar-
antee that the content of a tuple space was generated
by its owner can have multiple beneficial implications.
Public keys and services can be published in such a
tuple space without worrying about the man-in-the-
middle attack and eliminating the necessity for other
agents to verify the creator information of a tuple.
We place our work at a level above the physical level
so we do not address issues related to radio communi-
cation interference or any other low level attacks.
6 Related Work
In an open environment such as a computer net-
work and especially in presence of mobile code roam-
ing across hosts, security is an important issue. Other
projects also address this issue, trying to add different
levels of protection to mobile agent systems and tuple
space coordination of mobile agents. KLAIM (A Ker-
nel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility) [13]
addresses the protection of data through the use of a
capability based system combined with type hierarchy
based system for access control. In Secure Spaces [19]
the authors employ a finer grained approach to tuple
matching mechanisms than the original Linda model.
They go down to field level to address security. They
can protect each field individually by locking it with a
password. This is somehow similar to using exact value
matching for specific fields in the matching mechanisms
described in this paper. Agents can be stopped from
learning from tuples by requesting them to provide ex-
act information in the templates for tuple matching.
Several systems address the issue of protecting hosts
from malicious agents. The D’Agents system [8]
uses public key cryptography to authenticate incoming
agents and thus increasing the security of hosts. The
more difficult problem of protecting the agent form cu-
rious hosts led to the approach of computing with en-
crypted functions [15], [14]. The key idea here is that
mobile agents are able to decrypt code and data only if
certain conditions are met by the computing environ-
ment or at a specific moment.
In [16] the author proves that strong typing is an
essential concept for achieving strong security proper-
ties. The access rights are stored in a typed access
rights matrix inspired by the HRU model[10]. A capa-
bility based system adapted to distributed computing
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is described in [7]. In Yalta [2] clients are logically
grouped in dynamic coalitions. Yalta relies on certifi-
cates and certification authorities for emission, revo-
cation and validation of certificates which leads to an
architecture with several centralized hot points (certi-
fication authority and certification revocation service).
A distributed approach to trust management is de-
scribed in [1]. Here, a trust relationship defined be-
tween exactly two entities is asymmetrical (unidirec-
tional) and conditionally transitive. A direct trust
relationship exists between two entities for collabora-
tion reasons and a recommendation trust relationship
is needed to spread trust information throughout the
client. One type of relationship does not imply another
(i.e., if Alice trusts Bob to recommend Cindy it does
not imply that Alice trusts Bob to work with him).
Administrative domains [3], [20] restrict the execu-
tion environment by logically dividing it into nested
levels. The scope of a user’s operations can be limited
to his/her domain and the movement of running code
restricted to well determined areas.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a way to add security
capabilities to the Lime coordination model, to better
control who can do what and how with which tuples.
We have showed that simple changes can transform a
coordination model in a secure platform suited for the
development of secure applications. The mechanisms
are general and can solve real issues in terms of secure
coordination in ad hoc networks.
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